Russ
Well-known member
oh snap guestbooks in the house.
What happens to ppls forums if the worst comes from the legal accusations?
- Thread starter tenants
- Start date
oh snap guestbooks in the house.
Daniel Schulz-Jackson
Member
All right !! Kier's official announcement got me all settled. So time to "unwatch" this now
This sounds like useful information; could you link to it please?
Thanks,
tenants
Well-known member
I think this was the announcement tafreehm was referring to:
http://xenforo.com/community/threads/onwards.31311/#post-358409
http://xenforo.com/community/threads/onwards.31311/#post-358409
tafreehm
Well-known member
yeap, this was it.
Thanks
BGL
Well-known member
Basically, we would have purchased stolen property, gotta give it back.
But I wouldn't worry about. vB would make us all offers to convert or keep XenForo going and make us pay a license fee. We'd all have time and options.
My plan would be to move to IPBoard since they have an importer for XenForo. Hopefully by that time IPBoard would look as good and work as good as XenForo. Or some other pros from Dover would have a new hot product out.
Most likely there would be a mad scamble for XenForo customers by vB and IPBoard and others with all kinds of deals offered.
Keep in mind we are likely talking middle of 2013. Even if they gave up tomorrow and gave vB everything in return for dropping suit, unless there is a license death worm embedded in XenForo (how do they control license expiration?), there's nothing vB could do quickly and they would want the business so we'd get all kinds of offers.
Bottom line, if you like XenForo and it works for you, don't worry about it.
I'm likely going to buy it and build from scratch knowing all this is going on.
Dynamic
Well-known member
I own two xenforo licenses. Should the worst thing happen, and xenforo is forced to close down, and IB takes ownership and forces people to close their xenforo installs, it will only make one difference to me. The only difference it will mean, is I will no longer be able to update to newer versions of the software, as official development would have stopped. There is no chance in hell that xenforo is going to get uninstalled from my website due to those reasons.
jadmperry
Well-known member
This is just my opinion, but I think, in the EXTREMELY unlikely (and for all intensive purposes, hypothetical) that XF was found to infringe in some way on IB copyrights, I think nothing happens to the copies in the hands of purchasers.
This is a an excerpt from a District Court in the Ninth Circuit (which is the circuit where this case is being heard):
"III. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not authorize the impoundment of infringing property purchased by a non-infringing person.
Defendant Deborah Lindquist argues that the request for impoundment under Count III should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Lindquist infringed any copyrights by purchasing or possessing "La Laveuse," and 17 U.S.C. § 503 does not permit the impoundment of infringing property once it has been purchased by an innocent third party. The issue hinges on the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a).
Before the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, a copyright holder could not obtain the impoundment of infringing articles possessed by a non-infringing purchaser. Section 101(c) of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided: If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright law of the United States such person shall be liable…. (c) To deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright.17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970) (amended 1976). The words "such person" were interpreted to permit the impoundment of an infringing work only when it was possessed by a defendant who had himself infringed the plaintiff's copyright. See Foreign & Domestic Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2nd Cir. 1952) (finding impoundment improper when sought against a purchaser of copyrighted material because the "remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only against an infringer" and "one does not infringe a copyright by buying an infringing copy" of a work); Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that impoundment could not interrupt a bailee's possession because, 6under the 1909 Act, the remedy was "expressly limited to infringers"); Matenciot, Inc. v. Dash, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (describing an impoundment order concerning items in the infringer's "possession or control"); 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.07, at 14-160 (2006) ("Under the 1909 Act, impoundment and destruction were applicable only against an infringer."). n1
FOOTNOTES
n1 The United States Supreme Court Copyright Practice Rules, promulgated pursuant to § 25(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082, established procedural rules governing the remedy of impoundment. However, the Rules are silent on the issue of whether impoundment may be imposed against a non-infringing purchaser of infringing works. See Copyright Practice R. 3-13. Additionally, although the Rules were never explicitly abrogated by the 1976 Act, see Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1124 (2nd Cir. 1989), there is some question as to their continuing validity, for they have been widely criticized as constitutionally infirm and inconsistent with both § 503 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Rather than apply the Rules, which require impoundment if the plaintiff files with the court clerk an affidavit and surety bond, a substantial body of authority orders impoundment only after it is deemed proper under the standards governing preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Pearson v. Quickturn Design Sys., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *9-13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1998); Cybermedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073, 1080-81 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Van Deurzen & Assocs. v. Sanders, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12884, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 1991).
Principles of equity were occasionally referenced in support of this interpretation. In Jewelers' Circular, for example, a writ of seizure was denied with regard to infringing books that the defendant bookstore had already lent to its customers. The result was primarily grounded in the language of § 101 of the 1909 Act. However, it was also noted that seizure of the books would have been inequitable as both "extremely disastrous" to the defendant's business and unhelpful to the plaintiff. 274 F. at 937.
Although sparse, the legislative history also supported the view that the old § 101(c) did not authorize the impoundment of infringing items purchased by non-infringing parties. Congressional analysis of the statute suggested that impoundment would target only items possessed by infringers. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 16 (1909) (explaining how the remedy of impoundment is "necessary in dealing with infringers"). Motivating this approach, it seems, was the view that impoundment is a severe remedy that is only appropriate in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearing Before the House and Senate Comm. on Patents, 60th [**7] Cong. 166, 169 [*1109] (1908) (statement of Albert H. Walker); Copyright Hearings: Arguments Before the Senate and House Comm. on Patents on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 146 (1906) (statement of Ansley Wilcox, Esq.). n3
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int'l Found. for Anticancer Drug Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1107-1109 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(Continued in next post)
This is a an excerpt from a District Court in the Ninth Circuit (which is the circuit where this case is being heard):
"III. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not authorize the impoundment of infringing property purchased by a non-infringing person.
Defendant Deborah Lindquist argues that the request for impoundment under Count III should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Lindquist infringed any copyrights by purchasing or possessing "La Laveuse," and 17 U.S.C. § 503 does not permit the impoundment of infringing property once it has been purchased by an innocent third party. The issue hinges on the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a).
Before the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, a copyright holder could not obtain the impoundment of infringing articles possessed by a non-infringing purchaser. Section 101(c) of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided: If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright law of the United States such person shall be liable…. (c) To deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright.17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970) (amended 1976). The words "such person" were interpreted to permit the impoundment of an infringing work only when it was possessed by a defendant who had himself infringed the plaintiff's copyright. See Foreign & Domestic Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2nd Cir. 1952) (finding impoundment improper when sought against a purchaser of copyrighted material because the "remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only against an infringer" and "one does not infringe a copyright by buying an infringing copy" of a work); Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that impoundment could not interrupt a bailee's possession because, 6under the 1909 Act, the remedy was "expressly limited to infringers"); Matenciot, Inc. v. Dash, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (describing an impoundment order concerning items in the infringer's "possession or control"); 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.07, at 14-160 (2006) ("Under the 1909 Act, impoundment and destruction were applicable only against an infringer."). n1
FOOTNOTES
n1 The United States Supreme Court Copyright Practice Rules, promulgated pursuant to § 25(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082, established procedural rules governing the remedy of impoundment. However, the Rules are silent on the issue of whether impoundment may be imposed against a non-infringing purchaser of infringing works. See Copyright Practice R. 3-13. Additionally, although the Rules were never explicitly abrogated by the 1976 Act, see Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1124 (2nd Cir. 1989), there is some question as to their continuing validity, for they have been widely criticized as constitutionally infirm and inconsistent with both § 503 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Rather than apply the Rules, which require impoundment if the plaintiff files with the court clerk an affidavit and surety bond, a substantial body of authority orders impoundment only after it is deemed proper under the standards governing preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Pearson v. Quickturn Design Sys., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *9-13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1998); Cybermedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073, 1080-81 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Van Deurzen & Assocs. v. Sanders, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12884, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 1991).
Principles of equity were occasionally referenced in support of this interpretation. In Jewelers' Circular, for example, a writ of seizure was denied with regard to infringing books that the defendant bookstore had already lent to its customers. The result was primarily grounded in the language of § 101 of the 1909 Act. However, it was also noted that seizure of the books would have been inequitable as both "extremely disastrous" to the defendant's business and unhelpful to the plaintiff. 274 F. at 937.
Although sparse, the legislative history also supported the view that the old § 101(c) did not authorize the impoundment of infringing items purchased by non-infringing parties. Congressional analysis of the statute suggested that impoundment would target only items possessed by infringers. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 16 (1909) (explaining how the remedy of impoundment is "necessary in dealing with infringers"). Motivating this approach, it seems, was the view that impoundment is a severe remedy that is only appropriate in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearing Before the House and Senate Comm. on Patents, 60th [**7] Cong. 166, 169 [*1109] (1908) (statement of Albert H. Walker); Copyright Hearings: Arguments Before the Senate and House Comm. on Patents on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 146 (1906) (statement of Ansley Wilcox, Esq.). n3
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int'l Found. for Anticancer Drug Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1107-1109 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(Continued in next post)
jadmperry
Well-known member
Continued from previous post
A. Statutory Construction
Most importantly, Plaintiff's interpretation fails because it is inadequately supported by the text of § 503(a). HN13The first sentence of the statute provides that impoundment may be ordered "[a]t any time while an action under [Title 17] is pending." Id. Given that Title 17 concerns actions for copyright infringement, this language plays the same role in the 1976 Act that the words "such person" played in § 101(c) of the 1909 Act. The quoted language in each statute weighs against impoundment involving non-infringers by closely connecting the impoundment remedy with the infringement cause of action. If Congress had intended for impoundment to be available against non-infringers, the statute would have permitted impoundment regardless of whether an action for infringement is pending.
This interpretation harmonizes § 503(a) with other provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976. No other statutory remedies are given against persons who are not otherwise liable for infringement. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 502 provides for injunctive relief "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." While the issuance of an injunction is a matter of judicial discretion, such relief is not granted where the addressee of the injunction has not violated the plaintiff's copyrights and is not likely to in the future. See, e.g., Broadcast Music., Inv. v. Fox Amusement Co., 551 F. Supp. 104, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Where there is not a threat of infringement by the defendant, the remedy cannot be said to "prevent or restrain infringement." Other remedies are even more explicitly predicated on the liable individual's act of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (providing that "an infringer" of copyright is liable for either the copyright owner's actual damages or statutory damages);...
Canons of statutory construction also support the restriction of § 503(a) impoundment to infringers. Generally speaking, an "amendatory act is not to be construed to change the original act or section further than expressly declared or necessarily implied." 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30, at 267 (5th ed. 1992). The 1976 Act focuses exclusively on the nature of the items that permissibly may be impounded. There is no express discussion or necessary implication that works possessed by non-infringing parties fall within the scope of the remedy. The words of § 503(a) are thus ill-suited to expand greatly the scope of the impoundment remedy and to reverse a settled rule under the 1909 Act. See 4 Nimmer § 14.07, at 14-160 ("It seems unlikely… that any substantive change [with § 503(a)] was deliberate. Congress can scarcely have intended, for example, that everyone who has purchased and has on his home library shelf a copy of a plagiarizing novel becomes liable to surrender such copy under the impounding provisions.").
Finally, the legislative history lacks any indication that Congress intended to allow plaintiffs to impound infringing works purchased by non-infringing parties. The words "such person" were left out of every draft of the current statute.... It is hard to imagine that Congress would have drastically departed from a significant historical limitation on impoundment without any discussion whatsoever.
B. Judicial Application of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)
Judicial application of § 503(a) also casts doubt on the notion that impoundment may be ordered against innocent purchasers. The cases uniformly employ the remedy only against infringers. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am. v. Computer & Entm't, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20975, at * 14 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (ordering impoundment in these circumstances); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ordering the impoundment of all infringing copies within the infringing defendant's control); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 990-91 (D. Minn. 1986) (ordering only the defendants who were liable for infringement to forfeit infringing items "in their possession or within their control"); Cassidy v. Bowlin, 540 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (ordering the impoundment of infringing items "under the control of or which [could] be reasonably obtained by the defendants" who were liable for infringement); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) [**16] (ordering the impoundment of infringing items within the "possession or control" of the infringing defendant), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Nat'l Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (declining as impractical a request to order the recall of infringing books purchased by non-infringing customers of the defendant); Dollcraft Indus., 479 F. Supp. at 1118 (ordering the allegedly infringing defendants to deposit with the U.S. Marshal infringing items which were "in their possession, under their control, or which [could] be obtained by them through reasonable efforts"); Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures Under the Copyright Act: The Constitutional Infirmities, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 211, 220 (1985) (explaining that, under the 1976 Act, "courts have generally followed the case law under the 1909 Act and have only ordered impoundment of infringing articles actually under defendant's possession and control"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 advisory committee's note on 2001 amendments (discussing concerns that notice of impoundment [**17] may enable an "infringer" to defeat the court's capacity to grant effective relief). While none of the cited cases provide any substantial analysis of § 503(a), their dispositions reveal a pattern of limited discretion that is inconsistent with Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute. See also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 86, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that impoundment must be necessary, reasonable, and comport with the requirements of due process).
In summary, Plaintiff's interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) is incorrect; the statute does not permit the impoundment of infringing items in the hands of innocent purchasers who are not themselves liable for infringement. Count III will be dismissed with prejudice."
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int'l Found. for Anticancer Drug Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109-1112 (D. Ariz. 2006)
A lot of the ideas floating around this thread are unlikely/implausible. I don't have time to go through each. I will just say that any personal risk for purchasers of XF (including loss of use of the software presently in your possession), is almost unthinkable.
A. Statutory Construction
Most importantly, Plaintiff's interpretation fails because it is inadequately supported by the text of § 503(a). HN13The first sentence of the statute provides that impoundment may be ordered "[a]t any time while an action under [Title 17] is pending." Id. Given that Title 17 concerns actions for copyright infringement, this language plays the same role in the 1976 Act that the words "such person" played in § 101(c) of the 1909 Act. The quoted language in each statute weighs against impoundment involving non-infringers by closely connecting the impoundment remedy with the infringement cause of action. If Congress had intended for impoundment to be available against non-infringers, the statute would have permitted impoundment regardless of whether an action for infringement is pending.
This interpretation harmonizes § 503(a) with other provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976. No other statutory remedies are given against persons who are not otherwise liable for infringement. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 502 provides for injunctive relief "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." While the issuance of an injunction is a matter of judicial discretion, such relief is not granted where the addressee of the injunction has not violated the plaintiff's copyrights and is not likely to in the future. See, e.g., Broadcast Music., Inv. v. Fox Amusement Co., 551 F. Supp. 104, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Where there is not a threat of infringement by the defendant, the remedy cannot be said to "prevent or restrain infringement." Other remedies are even more explicitly predicated on the liable individual's act of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (providing that "an infringer" of copyright is liable for either the copyright owner's actual damages or statutory damages);...
Canons of statutory construction also support the restriction of § 503(a) impoundment to infringers. Generally speaking, an "amendatory act is not to be construed to change the original act or section further than expressly declared or necessarily implied." 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30, at 267 (5th ed. 1992). The 1976 Act focuses exclusively on the nature of the items that permissibly may be impounded. There is no express discussion or necessary implication that works possessed by non-infringing parties fall within the scope of the remedy. The words of § 503(a) are thus ill-suited to expand greatly the scope of the impoundment remedy and to reverse a settled rule under the 1909 Act. See 4 Nimmer § 14.07, at 14-160 ("It seems unlikely… that any substantive change [with § 503(a)] was deliberate. Congress can scarcely have intended, for example, that everyone who has purchased and has on his home library shelf a copy of a plagiarizing novel becomes liable to surrender such copy under the impounding provisions.").
Finally, the legislative history lacks any indication that Congress intended to allow plaintiffs to impound infringing works purchased by non-infringing parties. The words "such person" were left out of every draft of the current statute.... It is hard to imagine that Congress would have drastically departed from a significant historical limitation on impoundment without any discussion whatsoever.
B. Judicial Application of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)
Judicial application of § 503(a) also casts doubt on the notion that impoundment may be ordered against innocent purchasers. The cases uniformly employ the remedy only against infringers. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am. v. Computer & Entm't, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20975, at * 14 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (ordering impoundment in these circumstances); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ordering the impoundment of all infringing copies within the infringing defendant's control); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 990-91 (D. Minn. 1986) (ordering only the defendants who were liable for infringement to forfeit infringing items "in their possession or within their control"); Cassidy v. Bowlin, 540 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (ordering the impoundment of infringing items "under the control of or which [could] be reasonably obtained by the defendants" who were liable for infringement); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) [**16] (ordering the impoundment of infringing items within the "possession or control" of the infringing defendant), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Nat'l Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (declining as impractical a request to order the recall of infringing books purchased by non-infringing customers of the defendant); Dollcraft Indus., 479 F. Supp. at 1118 (ordering the allegedly infringing defendants to deposit with the U.S. Marshal infringing items which were "in their possession, under their control, or which [could] be obtained by them through reasonable efforts"); Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures Under the Copyright Act: The Constitutional Infirmities, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 211, 220 (1985) (explaining that, under the 1976 Act, "courts have generally followed the case law under the 1909 Act and have only ordered impoundment of infringing articles actually under defendant's possession and control"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 advisory committee's note on 2001 amendments (discussing concerns that notice of impoundment [**17] may enable an "infringer" to defeat the court's capacity to grant effective relief). While none of the cited cases provide any substantial analysis of § 503(a), their dispositions reveal a pattern of limited discretion that is inconsistent with Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute. See also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 86, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that impoundment must be necessary, reasonable, and comport with the requirements of due process).
In summary, Plaintiff's interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) is incorrect; the statute does not permit the impoundment of infringing items in the hands of innocent purchasers who are not themselves liable for infringement. Count III will be dismissed with prejudice."
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int'l Found. for Anticancer Drug Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109-1112 (D. Ariz. 2006)
A lot of the ideas floating around this thread are unlikely/implausible. I don't have time to go through each. I will just say that any personal risk for purchasers of XF (including loss of use of the software presently in your possession), is almost unthinkable.
BGL
Well-known member
US amended 1976 in 1989 and went with international standard of Berne Convention on copyright. Though maybe no net effect in this case, XenForo can't sell the alleged purloined code but those who purchased don't have to return it. Though with yearly license fees required that might be a moot point. People would have at most a year to pay the renewal fee or migrate to another forum software.
The day of decision would be year to two years from today since trial is not even set to begin until next year.
Garcon! More XenForo for my friends!
jadmperry
Well-known member
Look at the case cited; it is a 2006 case. The amendments don't change this case (as you alluded to). This is not a case with international copyright implications. The suit is based on US and California law.
I think it's a leap to assume anything about what XF can or can't do.
Don't be so sure about the timing of a decision. Once discovery is closed, there could be additional motions. While it is possible that a decision could come well off in the future, recall that in a jury trial (should it get to that point), the jury will render a decision at trial. This could well be the end of things (though, on the other hand, post-trial motions could drag things on...my point is that I don't want people assuming a decision is years off. It could, but it could also be a matter of months).
BGL
Well-known member
US copyright law is Berne Convention since 1989. There are cases going in UK and US. It's very much an international case. Otherwise UK guys could ignore it.
But the take home message is that it is a no never mind for people using XenForo. Decision day for them, even under worst case scenario, is one to two years out.
Of course, changing software is never a good thing as far as users go, so that time frame might be a show stopper for some. To this thread's author's question, don't think the Sheriff will be showing up with a habeas corpus.
jadmperry
Well-known member
You misunderstand. I am not writing this to argue with you specifically. The case in the US District Court, Central District of California (the case against XF) does not turn on or implicate the Berne Convention. Look at the pleadings and court documents to see for yourself. There may well be ongoing UK and US cases based on the Berne Convention (which, would essentially allege that an infringer violated Copyright law of another country and the violation should be remedied in the UK or US court, as appropriate). That is not the case here. IB is alleging that XF (and the defendants personally) violated US Copyright law. To see this, look at the SAC, http://shamil.co.uk/pdf/vbsi-xfl/90-1.pdf, First Claim, Para. 50, which only allege violations of the Copyright Act, 17 USC Sections 106 and 501. I see no reference to Berne Convention allegations.
The "international" nature of the case would only be in terms of the nationality and residence of the defendants. But, the court, thus far, has found that they meet minimum contacts, such as to expose them to subject matter jurisdiction of US courts. This (and more importantly, the allegations that allege violations of US Copyright law) makes the case essentially a matter of US domestic law.
If you can find a reference anywhere in the present case to the Berne Convention, I would be interested in seeing it. If so, that means I missed that point (though, I don't think I have). Yes, the Berne Convention exists and can be litigated as a basis of a claim. If so, it might have international law implications. It is just that it has not been and therefore does not apply as an issue in this case based on US domestic law.
All that said, I think we are essentially in agreement that there is little to no (and in my view, no) risk for current users of XF.
Steven UK
New member
As we are preparing to move our forum over to Xenforo software, I am wondering about the current VBulletin lawsuit I just read about.
I know things happen in business, although I am now wondering what would happen in the event of a negative outcome. Would purchasers of the Xenforo software still own it, and be able to continue using it, or could intellectual property issues render the software void of use?
I would appreciate some clarification, as we were going to make the purchase tomorrow.
Thank you in advance.
I know things happen in business, although I am now wondering what would happen in the event of a negative outcome. Would purchasers of the Xenforo software still own it, and be able to continue using it, or could intellectual property issues render the software void of use?
I would appreciate some clarification, as we were going to make the purchase tomorrow.
Thank you in advance.
In short. You will get to keep your XenForo forum.
Jake Bunce
Well-known member
vB seeks to have the courts award them ownership of the XF IP, and they claim up to $12 million in damages. So a worst case scenario might be that vB gets ownership of XF in which case I can only assume vB will continue to support the product. It's all speculation. XF has said it expects to win the lawsuit and the public shares that expectation. The worst case scenario looks to be one where XF concedes due to financial pressure. If the lawsuit makes it to trial then public opinion is that vB will fold quickly. The trial date is currently set for January 2013.
I personally wouldn't worry. Obviously XF has chosen to fight and not concede. The lawsuit is a financial drain on the company but the product itself has been hugely successful. The fundamentals are there. It's just a waiting game with this lawsuit.
BGL
Well-known member
I'm in the same boat. Lots of discussions here about it. Bottom line no one can give a definitive answer.
From a practical point of view, if we bought now and were using it, our forums would continue to work fine, we wouldn't owe any more money to anyone, conceivably the support would disappear along with this forum with the add ons and user help though I'm sure someone would host a users group somewhere.
Issues would come up when the license expired. If XenForo just ceased to exist, we would be merrily rolling along, no issues, getting maintenance from some of the XenForo professionals (in my case) or tweaking it yourself if adept. If someone else owned XenForo, don't know what happens with active forum with out of date license. Someone else can answer that, just no upgrades or support or is their some kind of shutdown DNA in the code?
I like the user interface so much, I'm planning to go ahead, barring some vB5/Xenforo news on June 12. Even with the unknowns. Even with needing a lot of add-ons. I figure I've got a couple years with XenForo with my limited requirements no matter what happens from black hole to total absorption to limping along to XenForo wins and owns vB.
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